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SERVICE PARTNER CAPITAL AGREEMENTS: 
THE LEADING CASES AND A RESPONSE TO 
CRITICS 
by Val D. Ricks* 
Two persons form a partnership.  One, the "money partner," agrees to 
provide money for the venture, the other, service.  Business begins, 
proceeds for a time, and then ends.  There is a loss, overall.  Creditors are 
paid, but there are no profits, and less cash at the end than at the beginning.  
The service partner's time has been wasted.  The money partner has made a 
bad investment. 
 When the money partner looks at the partnership code, she sees that 
the partnership has an obligation to reimburse her capital losses.1  The 
money partner has a capital loss.2  But the partnership is too poor to pay it.  
Nonetheless, the default provisions of the partnership code require that 
losses—including, apparently, capital losses—be split equally between the 
partners.3  Many money partners have claimed at this point that, as a capital 
loss is split equally, the service partner should therefore pay into the 
 
*Vinson & Elkins Research Professor and Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.  
The author wishes to thank Gary Rosin, Bruce McGovern, and students in several years' 
worth of Agency & Partnership classes for conversations about this topic. 
 1. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 18(a), 40 (1914); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(a)-(b), 807 (1997).  
In Texas, this result is reached through Texas Business Organizations Code §§ 152.202, 
.706, .707 (2006). 
 2. A comparison of balance sheets shows the loss.  At the time of formation, the 
partnership has assets equal to the money partner’s contribution.  With $0 in liabilities, 
equity is exactly equal to the money partner’s contribution.  When a “poor” partnership 
liquidates, it has fewer assets than were contributed by the money partner.  With $0 in 
liabilities, equity will equal the money partner’s original contribution less the amount by 
which assets are worth less than the original money contribution.  This is the amount of the 
loss. 
 3. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 18(b), 40(b), 40(d) (1914); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(a)-(b), 
807(b)-(c); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE §§ 152.202, .706, .707 (2009). 
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partnership half of the cash loss.  The money would be redistributed to the 
money partner.  The code supports the money partner's view.4  Courts have 
often applied the code as written.5  The code covers all partnerships.  If 
every partner puts in cash or property in exchange for a partnership interest, 
the result the code reaches is unobjectionable.  But the general rule gives 
no exception here. 
 For good reasons, the result seems odd and unfair.  Had the service 
partner the money himself, or had he borrowed it, the service partner might 
have undertaken the business without the money partner's involvement.  
That would have risked the service partner's own wealth.  Instead, another 
invested.  Now that there is a loss of that investment, the service partner is 
to repay part of it?  Moreover, the service partner also has a loss.  Whereas 
the money partner loses cash, the service partner loses time and service.  
The money can be repaid, or even re-earned, but the service partner's time 
and service are lost forever.  On top of that loss, the service partner is now 
to repay the money partner half of the cash loss?  The service partner might 
ask what is the point of having a money partner. 
 How many service partners would have thought it possible that they 
must cover not just their own investment but also half of their partner's?  
The commentary to the Uniform Act suggests that service partners actually 
will not—but legally must—contemplate just such an implausible result: 
It may seem unfair that the contributor of services, who 
contributes little or no capital, should be obligated to contribute 
toward the capital loss of the large contributor who contributed 
no services.  In entering a partnership with such a capital 
structure, the partners should foresee that application of the 
default rule may bring about unusual results and take advantage 
of their power to vary by agreement the allocation of capital 
losses.6 
The code thus presumes that the service partner should foresee that, if 
the business fails, the service partner might not only lose his own 
investment but also be liable for half of his partner's loss. 
 
 4. See statutes cited supra note 3 (supporting the notion that the service partner should 
contribute to the partnership’s losses). 
 5. See, e.g., Parker v. N. Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881 , 890 (Alaska 1988) (applying 
Alaska’s Uniform Partnership Act to determine partners’ division of losses); Seguin v. 
Boyd, 654 P.2d 808, 812 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (applying ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 29 to 
determine the rules of payment in relation to the partnership); Richert v. Handly, 330 P.2d 
1079, 1081 (Wash. 1958) (using the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act to determine 
the “rights and duties” of the partners). 
 6. The commentary to the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) suggests that service 
partners should know just that.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 cmt. 3 (1997).  The comment 
suggests that a partner should foresee an unusual result from a legal principle's application, 
an application not apparent on that principle's face.  This suggestion is unrealistic. 
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 The presumption is unrealistic.7  Only a partner contemplating a loss 
while entering a business would consider how that loss might be allocated, 
and businesspeople do not usually enter a business contemplating a loss.  
Partners often do not allocate losses at all.8  Not only would the partner 
have to plan for a loss, the partner would have to plan for the loss of 
someone else's money, namely, the money partner's.  The service partner 
would also have to assume that the loss would become an obligation of the 
partnership, a result unique to partnership law.9  And then the service 
partner would have to believe that the law would require the entirely 
counterintuitive result that the partner would be liable for the loss of some 
part of someone else's investment.  While all of this thinking against self-
interest might be expected of a partner's lawyer, it is too much to expect of 
the partner. 
 The presumption that a partner foresees the code's counter-intuitive 
result depends on another counter-intuitive conclusion mandated by the 
code:  The service partner's service is not a capital contribution.10  Yes, that 
 
 7. Eisenberg is even more emphatic.  He argues that the code comment 
does more to show why [the code] is wrong than why it is right.  The Comment 
begins by frankly recognizing that the result "may seem unfair."  It then states 
that even if the rule is unfair the partners can contract around it.  Of course, any 
rule of partnership law, no matter how foolish, could be "justified" by the 
argument that it can be contracted around.  The point of partnership law, 
however, should be to make good rules that the parties probably would have 
agreed to if they had addressed the issue, not to make bad rules that the partners 
can contract around.  Furthermore, many partners don't know partnership law, 
and therefore won't realize they need to contract around any given rule.  Indeed, 
because persons can be partners without an intention to form a partnership, 
many partners don't even realize that they are partners, let alone realize that they 
should consider contracting around any given rule of partnership law. 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 75 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 8. See, e.g., Kovacik v. Reed, 315 P.2d 314, 315 (Cal. 1957) (“The subject of a 
possible loss was not discussed in the inception of this venture.”); Kessler v. Antinora, 653 
A.2d 579, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (“No thought was given to losses.”). 
 9. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sounds of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 884-85 (1992) ("Partnership law also provides an example of a 
default rule that defies common sense.").  Corporate and LLC capital losses are suffered by 
individual shareholders.  No obligation exists for the entity to repay a capital loss, let alone 
for another shareholder to repay.  Corporate and LLC law make no distinction between 
shares and interests purchased with money and shares and interest purchased with services 
or the promise of services.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(b) (1984) ("any 
tangible or intangible property or benefit to the corporation, including . . . services 
performed, contracts for services to be performed"); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 152 (2008) 
("any tangible or intangible property or any benefit to the corporation, or any combination 
thereof"); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 401 (1996) ("tangible or intangible property or other 
benefit to the company, including . . . services performed, . . . or contracts for services to be 
performed"). 
 10. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914) ("contributions, whether by way of capital or 
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service buys an interest in the partnership, including, under default rules, an 
interest in half the profits,11 but the contribution is not credited to the 
partners' equity account.12  (A partner also is not generally entitled to 
compensation for services.13)  Thus, as the partnership begins, the law gives 
the money partner a capital account of $X, equaling the money the partner 
provided.  The service partner has a capital account of $0, as service is not 
considered capital.  This is not a natural conclusion for a service partner, 
but the service partner's obligation to pay half the money partner's loss 
depends as much on this presumption as on the other provisions.  If the 
partnership on dissolution, after paying creditors, has less cash than at the 
beginning, it has a cash loss.  Losses are split equally, as noted.  Therefore, 
at this juncture, the money partner's capital account will have $X-1/2L, 
where L is the loss.  The money partner's capital account may well show a 
positive balance.  It will if $X > 1/2L.  The service partner, who began with 
$0, now has a capital account totaling $0-1/2L.  This will always be a 
negative number, implying a duty to pay.14  The duty to contribute to a cash 
loss is thus dependent on the code's judgment that, ordinarily, the service 
partner's contribution is not capital. 
 The effect of the code on the service partner is in fact arbitrary 
relative to the way cash contributions are treated.  If the partnership breaks 
even on cash, all the cash is returned to the money partner, but the service 
partner suffers a complete loss.  If there is a loss of cash, the service partner 
not only suffers a complete loss but is required by the code to pay half the 
cash loss, also.15 
 These premises lead to several conclusions:  The code's default rule 
is not the rule the parties would have chosen.  The deal the parties actually 
made is counter to the result imposed by the code's rule.  Inasmuch as the 
code's rule surprises the parties, and in particular the service partner, after 
the partnership formation deal has already been struck, the rule is unfair.  
Inasmuch as the code's rule departs from the deal actually struck by the 
parties, the rule is inefficient. 
 
advances to the partnership property"); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(a)(1) (1997) ("money plus 
the value of any other property . . . the partner contributes"); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 
152.202(a)(1) (2008) ("the cash and the value of property the partner contributes"). 
 11. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (1997); TEX. BUS. 
ORGS. CODE § 152.202(c) (2008). 
 12. See statutes cited supra note 3. 
 13. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (1914); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (1997); TEX. BUS. 
ORGS. CODE § 152.203(c) (2008). 
 14. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807(b) (1997) ("A partner shall contribute to the partnership an 
amount equal to any excess of the charges over the credits in the partner's account . . . ."); 
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 152.707(d) (2006). 
 15. See EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 73-74 (pointing out the arbitrary nature of this 
result). 
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 These results appear inevitable under the code in most service 
partner cases, unless the one exception allowed by the code applies.  The 
code holds that all of the provisions mentioned thus far can be altered by 
agreement.16  Partners who think ahead and prepare for a potential loss are 
likely to reach some alternative agreement.17  If the partners agree that the 
services of the service partner are worth $X, or some other amount ($Y), as 
a capital contribution, then the service partner's account should begin at 
that number and on dissolution will equal $X-1/2L or $Y-1/2L, in the same 
fashion as the money partner's account.  Service partners are likely to insist 
on something like this.  Who would ever agree ex ante that their services 
are worthless?18  If the partners agree to split profits evenly and have equal 
management rights without pay other than profits, they likely will call 
themselves "equal partners" and mean that phrase to include the value of 
their contributions.19  An agreement may seem even more apparent to a 
court when faced with imposing on an equal service partner the code's 
 
 16. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18 (1914); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(a) (1997); TEX. BUS. ORGS. § 
152.002(a) (2006). 
 17. The comments to the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) imply this result.  See supra 
text accompanying note 6.  See also, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 74-75 ("It is unlikely 
that the parties would have agreed to this result if they had negotiated on the issue when the 
partnership was formed."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Contractarianism in the Business 
Associations Classroom: Kovacik v. Reed and the Allocation of Capital Losses in Service 
Partnerships, 34 GA. L. REV. 631, 648-49 (2000) ("Eisenberg likely is correct that [the 
partners] would not have agreed to an equal division of [cash] losses."). 
 18. Of course, the commitment to perform service is exchanged also for a share of the 
profits, but the code’s default rule operates before profits exist.  The service partner would 
only choose the default rule at formation if he believed, ex ante, that his service was 
valueless both at the beginning and throughout the life of the partnership.  Otherwise, that 
service should entitle him to some credit at dissolution. 
 19. Professor Bainbridge argues that "[a] rational service-only partner probably would 
accept some obligation to share capital losses."  Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 650.  (By 
"capital," Bainbridge means cash or money.)  This assertion is unconvincing.  Bainbridge 
reasons that the service partner might have accepted employment (with no risk) or sole 
proprietorship (with all the risk) as alternatives.  Thus, “[b]y choosing to enter into a 
partnership . . . [the service partner] accepted a higher degree of risk than he would bear as 
an employee, but he moderated the risks associated with sole ownership."  Id.  These 
premises do not lead the service partner to accept the risk of paying the money partner's 
loss, however.  Equally consistent with these premises is that the service partner expected to 
bear the risk of working without any compensation at all, a risk he did not have as an 
employee.  The service partner would most likely believe that he had less risk than a sole 
proprietor because the money partner would be putting up (and presumably losing, if a loss 
occurred) the cash.  Of course, the service partner would be mistaken in part if, in addition 
to losing all of his time and work, he also had to pay half of the money partner's loss.  No, 
given the equality evidenced elsewhere in the relationship, that the service partner would 
risk the loss of the value of his services while the money partner would shoulder all the risk 
of cash loss is the most likely deal a rational service partner would seek.  Why would the 
service partner take on more risk than an equal bargain required?  Of course, the service 
partner might explicitly accept that risk if facts showing bargaining inequality existed 
despite the otherwise equal deal the partners made. 
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requirement that the service partner pay back half of the other partner's 
investment.20 
Perhaps not surprisingly, a long line of cases exists in which courts 
have found agreements that alter the code's default provisions.  The most 
recent leading case is Becker v. Killarney (1988),21 but the most prominent 
is Kovacik v. Reed,22 a 1957 California case.  The oldest of these is Heran 
v. Hall (1840).23  None of these rests on an explicit agreement between the 
money partner and the service partner.  But the lack of an explicit 
agreement should be expected if the service partner would not rationally 
have suspected the need for such an agreement.  Accordingly, all of these 
cases rest on an implied understanding between the partners. 
 I discuss these leading cases, in particular Kovacik, in Part I.  Lately, 
advocates of the code’s default rule have imposed a new round of criticism 
on the case.  The criticism is not particularly persuasive, as I explain in Part 
I.B.  I am concerned to defend Kovacik not only because I believe it 
reaches a sound result but also because the policies that support it also 
support the line of Texas cases finding agreement in similar 
circumstances.24  The Texas case law falls on the Kovacik side of the 
argument, as I explain in Part II.  Thus, the defense of Kovacik also 
explains the Texas case law.  Briefly put, whether one sees Kovacik as a 
method of loss sharing based on agreement or as a kind of hypothetical 
bargain, Kovacik reaches the result most likely reflective of the partners' 
actual understanding and agreement.  It is therefore the most fair and 
efficient rule. 
 I conclude with a recommendation that, given the sound principles 
supporting the current line of leading service partner agreement cases, both 
Kovacik and the Texas branch of the Kovacik line of cases be retained and 
applied or codified as explications of the agreement exception to the 
otherwise applicable default capital loss sharing rule of the partnership 
 
 20. See, e.g., Sturdevant v. Hooper, 101 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 
(explicitly allocating by agreement all of the losses to the money partner).  On the line 
between Sturdevant and Kovacik is Baker v. Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 45 A. 
1028 (Md. 1900). 
 21. 532 N.E.2d 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 22. 315 P.2d 314 (Cal. 1957). 
 23. 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 159 (1840). 
 24. Please pardon the parochial interest.  I teach in Texas and enjoy association with 
corporate counsel in the state.  I am also thinking of just how many people are governed by 
the Kovacik rule.  The rule is followed in Texas, California, Illinois, and Kentucky.  It is 
imposed as a default rule as a matter of public policy in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  See 
Kessler v. Antinora, 653 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Snellbaker v. 
Herrmann, 462 A.2d 713, 716-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).  I have not done a full, fifty-state 
survey, but according to 2008 Census estimates, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates 
Data Sets, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009), 
over 99 million people, nearly one-third of the U.S. population, reside in these six states. 
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code. 
I. THE LEADING SERVICE PARTNER AGREEMENT CASES 
A. Becker v. Killarney (Ill. App. 1988)25 
 Becker's facts indicate that the services contributed to the 
partnership had value that the partners had by implicit agreement 
monetized and capitalized.  A lender repossessed a hotel in the middle of 
its renovation.26  Not wanting a half-finished project on its books, it 
approached the contractor, Becker, about taking over.  Becker responded 
by forming a partnership to take the hotel.  The partners included Becker 
himself, architect Burns, financier Dailey, attorney Parkhurst, and hotel 
manager Rosel.  None of the five contributed any money, only services.  
Only Rosel was compensated for services.  The partnership agreement 
prohibited other salaries.27 
 The cash to run the hotel came from Killarney and Feely.  Within 
months after the partnership formed, Killarney had contributed $160,000 in 
exchange for an 8% interest and Feely had contributed $100,000 for a 5% 
interest.  Both also signed the partnership agreement.  The lender invested 
another $10,500,000 non-recourse loan in the hotel, and Becker's 
construction company also fronted some costs. 
 The hotel, however, was unsuccessful.  It borrowed another 
$500,000 from the lender and eventually called on all the partners for two 
sets of capital infusion, each of $100,000, paid according to percentage 
shares in the venture.28 
 Eventually losses forced the hotel to close.  On finding themselves 
personally liable for some of the hotel's debts, the service partners sued the 
cash partners for contribution.  The cash partners, Killarney and Feely, 
responded by counterclaiming for losses of their capital.29 
 The court ruled in favor of the service partners.  In justifying its 
decision, the court reasoned, "[I]t is more likely that the parties ‘by their 
agreement to share equally in profits, agreed that the value of their 
contributions—the money on the one hand and the labor on the other—
were likewise equal.’"30  The court also claimed, "Equity requires that the 
 
 25. 532 N.E.2d 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 26. Id. at 932. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 932-33. 
 29. Id. at 933. 
 30. Id. at 934 (citing Kovacik v. Reed, 315 P.2d 314 (Cal. 1957)).  At another point in 
the opinion, the court used language which appears at first glance contrary to the agreement 
rationale; the court noted that it would capitalize the value of services "[a]bsent an 
agreement to the contrary."  Id.  Taken at face value, this statement seems opposite that of 
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value of services be recognized and capitalized, so as to prevent unjust 
enrichment."31 
 A striking aspect of Becker is that the partners themselves showed 
the monetization and capitalization of the service partners' contribution by 
naming the percentage of the partnership that Killarney and Feely 
purchased with cash.  No matter which way the court rationalized the rule, 
it would be difficult to argue that the partners had not given the services the 
status of valuable capital when they declared that an investment of 
$160,000 gave Killarney 8% of the partnership.  Obviously the partnership, 
which had never made a profit, was worth $2,000,000 by agreement of the 
partners.  Feely purchased 5% with $100,000.  Who owned the other 87%?  
There were only five other partners.  By elimination, the service partners 
owned it.  The facts show that the partners considered those services to be 
worth $1,740,000.  The case is justifiable as much on the grounds of tacit 
agreement as on equity and the avoidance of unjust enrichment. 
B. Kovacik v. Reed (Cal. 1957)32 
 Kovacik provides not much more in the way of rationale than does 
Becker.  Kovacik, a contractor, asked Reed, a job superintendent and 
estimator, to join him in a venture doing remodeling work for Sears 
Roebuck.33  Kovacik said he had $10,000 to invest.  He told Reed that, if 
Reed would estimate and superintend, Kovacik would split the profits with 
him 50-50.  The parties did not discuss losses. 
 The venture bid on, and was awarded, a number of remodeling jobs.  
Reed superintended all of them.  About ten months after it began, Kovacik 
told Reed that the venture had been unprofitable.  Kovacik demanded 
contributions from Reed for $4,340, half of Kovacik's capital losses of 
$8,680.34  Reed refused to pay anything.35  Kovacik sued.  He won at trial. 
 The California Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that 
 
the code, which fails to capitalize the value of services absent agreement to the contrary.  
See, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18 (1914) ("capital or advances to the partnership property"); 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 (1997) ("credited with an amount equal to the money plus the value 
of any other property . . . the partner contributes"); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 
152.202(a) (2009) ("the cash and the value of property the partner contributes").  Actually, 
the court’s language is consistent with the agreement rationale:  Given the facts of the case, 
including the agreement to share profits equally (or perhaps according to the interests 
allocated by the parties’ apparent agreement in this case), only evidence of explicit 
agreement otherwise would have turned the court away from its conclusion that the service 
partners’ services had by implicit agreement been capitalized. 
 31. 532 N.E.2d at 934. 
 32. 315 P.2d 314 (Cal. 1957). 
 33. Id. at 315. 
 34. Id. at 315-16. 
 35. Id. at 315. 
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"[w]here . . . one partner or joint adventurer contributes the money capital 
as against the other's skill and labor . . . neither party is liable to the other 
for contribution for any loss sustained."36  The court gave alternative 
rationales for this rule.  One is that it is equal:  "[W]here one party 
contributes money and the other contributes services, then in the event of a 
loss each would lose his own capital—the one his money and the other his 
labor."37  Alternately, the court reasoned, 
[I]n such a situation the parties have, by their agreement to share 
equally in profits, agreed that the value of their contributions—
the money on the one hand and the labor on the other—were 
likewise equal; it would follow that upon the loss, as here, of 
both money and labor, the parties have shared equally in the 
losses.38 
Proving that the parties agreed to split profits equally is not a difficult 
burden.  If showing that fact proves, absent evidence otherwise, an 
agreement that the partners not seek contribution for capital losses, then 
many money-service partnerships would qualify.  There is intuitive sense in 
the court's reasoning.  Would the parties have agreed to split profits equally 
if they considered their contributions to be unequal in value?  It is possible 
but not likely. 
 Kovacik has drawn more comment than any other case discussed in 
this paper.  The opinion is short, and rests on only a few facts showing 
agreement.  The combination of these aspects and the case’s applicability 
in a large commercial jurisdiction have made it a target for criticism, and 
some have raised objections, most notably Professor Stephen Bainbridge39 
and Professor Royce de Rohan Barondes.40  I do not believe their 
objections hold weight and shall explain why. 
 a. Economics?   
Professor Bainbridge purports to analyze the Kovacik case 
economically.41  Bainbridge sees Kovacik solely as establishing a default 
rule.42  A default rule is one that applies in the absence of an agreement of 
 
 36. Id. at 316. 
 37. Id.  Many courts have followed Kovacik's lead in declaring essentially as a matter of 
law that a service partner has no obligation to contribute to a capital loss upon dissolution.  
See, e.g., Kessler v. Antinora, 653 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Snellbaker v. 
Herrmann, 462 A.2d 713, 716-17 (Pa. Super. 1983). 
 38. 315 P.2d at 316. 
 39. See Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 631 et seq. 
 40. See Royce de R. Barondes, Services as Capital Contributions: Understanding 
Kovacik v. Reed, 3 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 1 (2008). 
 41. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 635. 
 42. Id. 
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the parties.  The court suggested that it might be imposing a default rule 
when it described the necessary antecedents to its ruling as "one party 
contributes money and the other contributes services" and a loss occurs.43  
But calling Kovacik merely a default rule ignores the Kovacik court's 
characterization of its own holding as based on agreement.  Recall that the 
court also stated: 
[I]n such a situation the parties have, by their agreement to share 
equally in profits, agreed that the value of their contributions—
the money on the one hand and the labor on the other—were 
likewise equal; it would follow that upon the loss, as here, of 
both money and labor, the parties have shared equally in the 
losses.44 
This "situation" is a limited exception to the statute:  one party 
contributes money, another contributes services (and presumably is 
receiving no other compensation for services, as Reed was not), they agree 
to split profits equally, and there is a capital loss.  The court is suggesting 
that when money and services are given solely and expressly for an equal 
share of profits, the two partners have impliedly agreed that the services are 
a capital contribution equal to the capital investment made by the money 
partner at least for the purpose of capital losses. 
 It is difficult to argue with the court's understanding.  The money 
partner is willing to split profits with the service partner because of the 
service partner's service—the service partner's so-called sweat equity in 
building the business.  The two have agreed that co-ownership of the 
business and half the profits, the exact things the money partner purchased 
with her money, are adequate quid pro quo for that service.  If the two 
really are partners—co-owners of a business and not employer and 
employee—then co-ownership and half the profits have been exchanged 
solely for the service of the service partner, the only thing the service 
partner has offered.  Co-ownership was not a gift from the money partner.  
If it was not, then the most likely and logical conclusion is that it was 
bought with the services that the service partner contributed. 
 The word services is in fact reductive.  By services, I mean, and 
certainly money partners mean to pay for, more than a mere act or a 
promise of acts.  Partners are not hiring someone to wash windows.  Why 
does one choose a particular service partner and not just hire an employee?  
It is not just the acts but the knowledge, skill, and commitment of a person 
that bring a business opportunity to fruition, what one commentator 
appropriately calls "human capital."45  It also includes business reputation 
 
 43. 315 P.2d at 316. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Sarah Pendergraft, From Human Capital to Capital Gains: The Puzzle of Profits 
Interests, 27 VA. TAX REV. 709, 740-46 (2008). 
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and network, knowledge of what will not work, potential customer 
contacts, judgment with respect to consumer demand (for example, Apple's 
Steve Jobs), and creativity.46  Often it will include the very business idea in 
which the money partner is investing.  The service partner often brings 
great value to the partnership, value that may in the long run bring a much 
greater return than the money contributed or than the money could have 
brought in any other investment.  Therefore, it should not be surprising for 
a court to find that the parties have agreed that their equities are at least 
equivalent in an important sense.  And if they consider their equities 
equivalent for purposes of profits, then they presumably see them as 
equivalent for purposes of losses. 
 I do not believe that the Kovacik court was suggesting that the 
parties thought their contributions were necessarily equal in monetary value 
for all purposes.47  And the partners would likely never think that their 
contributions were equal in that sense after the moment of formation.  The 
court's conclusion does not depend on this premise.  Nonetheless, some 
have argued this red herring, most notably Professor Bainbridge and 
Professor Barondes.  Both object that a money partner's and a service 
partner's contributions cannot be equal because a money partner's 
contribution, on the one hand, is to pay a sum certain of money at a specific 
time while a service partner's service, on the other hand, begins and then 
continues on indefinitely, changing value as it continues.48 
 This argument can be illustrated by a hypothetical given by 
Professor Bainbridge.  On day 1 of the partnership, money partner 
contributes $20,000.  On day 1, service partner works eight hours.  If the 
partnership dissolves at the end of this day, does this mean that the service 
partner’s work was worth $10,000?49  Or, we can stretch out the time (and 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. The money partner, if rational, believes at formation that the business opportunity 
and access to the service partner's services are worth more than the money contribution.  
Otherwise, the money partner would be knowingly overpaying. 
 48. See Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 662-63; see also Barondes, supra note 40, at 1 et 
seq. (positing that the implicit agreement that the value of services provided by the service 
partner equals the amount the partnership loses on a cash basis seems implausible because 
the more the firm ultimately loses, the more those services are therefore agreed to be worth). 
 49. Bainbridge believes this objection to the Kovacik rule is plausible at least 
theoretically.  Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 662-63.  It is actually completely implausible 
and irrelevant.  First, Kovacik does not apply to the hypothetical because there is no loss.  
Second, Bainbridge misreads the parties' bargain.  They have traded co-ownership for 
service, and after one day, the bargained-for service has not really been given.  Third, no 
court would allow the service partner to game a legal rule in this fashion, especially one 
founded, as Kovacik's is, on an implied agreement.  The suggestion that the parties impliedly 
agreed that the service partner could cheat the money partner in this fashion assumes not 
that the parties are reasonable, the basis of nearly all implication, but rather that one partner 
is sneaky and the other is a dolt.  No one would ever have agreed to such a result in the real 
world, and no court would conclude by implication that they had so agreed. 
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here I add to Professor Bainbridge's hypothetical).  Suppose the partnership 
survives and thrives with only that $20,000 in seed money.  The service 
partner runs it profitably for the next ten years without the money partner's 
paying another dime or lifting a finger.  Eventually, the business is taken 
public and the two partners split $1 billion.  Is there any way to say that the 
contributions of the two were equal?  No, if by “equal” one means worth 
the same dollar amount. 
 Professor Bainbridge also suggests the case of Larsen v. Claridge.50  
In Larsen, one partner provided a farm and the other provided the labor to 
operate it.  The two agreed to split profits equally.  After five years, the 
partnership dissolved and the service partner claimed half the farm.  The 
court rejected this claim.  Professor Bainbridge argues, resting on the 
notion that Kovacik said the contributions were "equal," that Larsen's 
holding is inconsistent with the rationale of Kovacik.51  The holding is not 
inconsistent, as I explain below, but the court's rationale seems to be.  
Despite that the partners had agreed to split profits equally, the court said, 
"The record does not show that there was an agreement between [the 
partners] which would equate the labor as provided by [the service partner] 
in monetary value with the actual capital contributed by" the property 
partner.52 
 Both of these objections to Kovacik share the same flaw:  They 
assume that Kovacik requires that the money and service offered as capital 
contributions be monetizable for the same amount for all purposes at a 
certain moment in time after formation.  Surely they cannot be.  But that is 
no objection to Kovacik.  The court was not claiming that money partners 
know or even guess at what no one can know:  the value of a service 
partner's contribution at every point in time in the future.  Even ex post the 
value of that contribution is never in fact monetized.  The worth of that 
service is never definite, even at the time of formation.  Partly it depends 
on the value of the business opportunity.  Ex ante, the business 
opportunity's monetary worth is itself generally ascertainable only within a 
range of values (depending at the least on what assumptions one makes 
about risk, cash flow, and the time value of money).  Additionally, this 
valuation is normally made without taking into account inevitable and 
inefficient human error.  Even the partnership formation itself as an event, 
with an agreement centered around a mix of money, property, service, and 
hope, is only partly sufficient at delimiting that range of values. 
 Whether the service partner is suited to bring the business plan to 
fruition is only proved by the business's success, and the value the service 
partner contributed to that success (or failure) is not quantifiable with 
 
 50. 534 P.2d 439 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). 
 51. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 664. 
 52. 534 P.2d at 440. 
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certainty, nor is it generally quantified after the partnership forms.  It was, 
however, roughly quantified once, at the time of formation, when the 
money partner agreed that it was roughly equal to the money contributed.  
That is not only the sole valuation of it that occurs, it is also the most 
relevant, because it occurred at the same time that the money partner 
determined her obligation to fund the venture.  The fact that neither a court 
nor the other partner ever quantify it again does not detract from the fact 
that one person, once, named its value:  the money partner, the very person 
who at dissolution is in these suits asking for an additional capital 
contribution from the service partner.  Having named that value and 
assumed all the risk of the uncertainty inherent in that valuation decision 
for purposes of getting into the partnership, the money partner should be 
bound to that choice on the way out of the partnership.  Doubling back on 
that choice would undercut the deal the partners made in the first instance.  
The Kovacik court asserted that the money partner has agreed that for 
purposes of capital formation, profits, and, hence, losses, the capital 
contributions are equal. 
 Thus, that a day after formation the service partner's contribution 
doesn't seem like much, or that fifteen years later it might seem 
overwhelmingly more valuable than it did that first day, is beside the point.  
In fact, no one gives a monetized value for the service partner's 
contribution after formation, and its value remains extremely uncertain.  
But one person once named it equal to the money contributed, and that 
person is now asking the service partner to contribute to a cash loss, as if 
the service partner's contribution were worth nothing at all.53  It is right and 
just at that point to hold the money partner to the formation bargain.54  The 
partners' implied agreement in the beginning prohibits the money partner 
from asking for that. 
 Why would it not also follow for the Larsen plaintiff to take half the 
farm?  Logically, the problem is not that the partners have never agreed 
that their contributions are equal; they might have so agreed.  But if the 
service partner agreed to take an equal share of the partnership for his 
services, then at dissolution he has already received back what he 
contributed.  He received back his services for the future, and can take 
 
 53. Professor Bainbridge also suggests that the service partner should pay the loss 
because, if there is a loss, "it is likely to be a result of poor work by the service partner."  
Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 649.  I find this completely implausible.  I cannot think of a 
single reason for a service partner who will profit from a venture only from profits to shirk 
or act negligently.  The mere failure of a business is no reason to fault the manager.  The 
case law language Professor Bainbridge cites in support of this argument provides no 
support at all. 
 54. One might analogize it to an admission, estoppel, waiver, or any number of other 
legal doctrines.  The economic and moral necessity of holding the money partner to the 
original deal would remain the same. 
RICKSFINAL_ONE 1/22/2010  5:08:50 PM 
14 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
those services elsewhere, just as the money or property partner can take her 
farm elsewhere.  This is surely what the court meant:  The services "as 
provided by" the service partner are not equal to the farm, which has 
indefinite value and potentially infinite future use.55  This conclusion is 
necessary no matter whether during the partnership the services committed 
indefinitely might have been worth the indefinite use of the land, as 
Kovacik might have concluded.  Only if the services already provided were 
worth half the land in perpetuity would splitting the land be equal. 
 A service partner's entitlement to the land, as requested in Larsen, 
would require proving the value of the prior services at the moment of 
dissolution.  This was five years after the partnership formed.56  If at that 
moment, half the farm and the services already provided to the partnership, 
without any services going forward, were actually equal in value, it would 
be an extremely unlikely coincidence.  And the court had no evidence 
before it of the value of the services already provided.57  Consistently with 
Kovacik, the Larsen court might have reasoned that at this late date, lacking 
any means of ascertaining the value of the services already provided but no 
longer offered and remaining in the service partner’s control, no way 
existed to determine how much of the farm should have been given to the 
service partner.  Under Kovacik, the partners’ contributions were equal at 
formation, when both would stretch indefinitely into the future.  Thus, the 
most fair and equitable division of partnership property was to award the 
farm back to the property partner and the future services of the service 
partner back to the service partner.  With the value of the future service 
taken into account, as Kovacik demands, the result in Larsen is an even 
split of partnership property.  This is appropriate and consistent with 
Kovacik given the partners' initial, implied agreement that the property and 
service were of equal value.  Because the service partner necessarily takes 
back future services, giving that service partner a part of the farm, too, 
might well have been overcompensation.  Thus, Larsen’s result is not only 
consistent with Kovacik but in fact affirms it.58 
 
 55. 534 P.2d at 440. 
 56. Id. at 439. 
 57. The record in Larsen did not show evidence of an agreement equating the labor 
with the monetary contribution.  534 P.2d at 440. 
 58. Professor Bainbridge makes another argument against a court's finding an implicit 
agreement that the service partner not contribute to capital losses.  It is a policy claim that 
this result gives the service partners an opportunity "for strategic behavior . . . in the end-
game."  Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 663. 
Assume the firm has suffered capital losses and the capital partner is 
considering pulling the plug by dissolving the firm.  In such a situation, the 
service partner may be tempted to wager all of the firm's remaining assets on a 
high-risk venture:  If the gamble pays off, and leaves the firm with profits to be 
divided, he shares in them.  If the gamble fails, however, he bears none of any 
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 b. Accounting?   
Professor Barondes makes a related argument illustrated with 
partnership accounting.59  He claims that Kovacik, which concludes that the 
parties have agreed that their contributions are of equal value, actually 
requires under partnership accounting practice that the service partner's 
contribution be deemed equal to the amount the partnership eventually 
loses on a cash basis:  "The more the firm ultimately loses, the more those 
services are agreed to be worth."60  Positing hypothetical numbers in capital 
accounts based on the facts of Kovacik, Professor Barondes suggests that 
the court would require initial capital accounts as follows: 
 
INITIAL CAPITAL ACCOUNTS 
 
Kovacik     $10,000 
Reed        $10,000 
 
Total        $20,00061 
 
 
additional capital losses. . . .  If the service partner makes the firm's day-to-day 
operating decisions, as will often be the case, Kovacik thus allows the service 
partner to gamble with someone else's money. 
Id.  I am unsure why this is an objection, nor am I sure how it is strategic.  If the service 
partner plays the partnership's last cash at the blackjack tables in Vegas and makes enough 
to meet payroll, the money partner may later thank him.  See, e.g., Fred Smith on the Birth 
of Fedex, BUS. WK., Sept. 20, 2004, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_38/b3900032_mz072.htm (describing 
Fred Smith’s successful trip to Las Vegas that allowed him to cover FedEx’s payroll costs).  
Moreover, Professor Bainbridge seems to believe that the service partner's contribution is 
worth nothing at all or that only money can be a contribution.  If all the money is gone, then 
neither gets any return on their contribution.  Furthermore, betting the farm is a common 
problem inherent in all agency relationships in which the agent can claim a share of the 
profits.  Corporate and LLC managers routinely bet the farm on the last few dollars and 
there is no possibility of their being liable because of a capital loss to shareholders or 
members.  Should a partner necessarily be less of a manager than Fred Smith?  Finally, 
Professor Barondes convincingly reasons that on certain facts the Kovacik rule may make 
managers more risk averse.  See Barondes, supra note 40, at 12-14.  If the money and 
service contributions are considered equal, then the managing partner may bet the farm as 
the money is about to run out, but will not do so if there is a possibility that the losses will 
exceed even the money contribution.  Id.  Even equal contributions do not prevent equal 
partners from being equally liable to third parties.  Given the uncertainties involved in 
betting the farm, the values placed on the service partner's actions by the parties, and both 
partners' absolute default right to quit the partnership at any moment, the danger of betting 
and the danger of overcaution seem like a wash. 
 59. Barondes, supra note 40, at 1-12. 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. Id. at 8. 
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Professor Barondes notes that if Kovacik has agreed that Reed's 
services are worth $10,000, then not only does Reed have a $10,000 initial 
capital account entry, the partnership also has an asset worth $10,000, 
namely, Reed's services.62 
 When the Kovacik-Reed firm dissolved, it had only $1,320 in cash 
(based on the case's report of an initial Kovacik contribution of $10,000 
and a cash loss of $8,68063).  Barondes claims that the capital loss of the 
firm is therefore $20,000 - $1,320 = $18,680.  Dividing this loss equally 
between the partners ($9,340 from each) leaves the firm owing Reed 
money (illustrated by the positive amount left in Reed's capital account): 
 
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AT DISSOLUTION 
 
Kovacik     $10,000 
        ($9,340) 
 
Total        $660 
 
Reed        $10,000 
        ($9,340) 
 
Total        $660 
 
Total        $1,32064 
 
This counter-intuitive result follows if accounting principles are 
applied to the court's conclusion, the argument goes.  Thus, Professor 
Barondes claims that accounting principles reach a result inconsistent with 
the result the Kovacik court applied, which was that Kovacik take nothing 
from Reed and, presumably, that Reed take nothing from the partnership.  
Professor Barondes then asks what value must be given to Reed's services 
in order for Reed to take nothing:  "The answer is $8,680.  It is not a 
coincidence . . . that this is the amount that the partnership lost on a cash 
(actual) basis."65  Professor Barondes then proposes that it is extremely 
unlikely that the partners agreed ex ante by implication that Reed's services 
would exactly equal Kovacik's ex post capital losses.  On that premise, 
Professor Barondes suggests it is unlikely that the partners agreed in the 
beginning that their contributions were equal, contrary to the Kovacik 
 
 62. Id. ("In order to have a value of $1,320 when it is wound-up, it has 'spent' both the 
$10,000 initial capital contribution as well as the $10,000 of Reed's services."). 
 63. Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 315-16. 
 64. Barondes, supra note 40, at 8. 
 65. Id. at 9. 
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court's inference otherwise.66 
 Professor Barondes's accounting recitation is flawed (similarly to 
Professor Bainbridge's examples) and circular.  While Professor Barondes 
has correctly identified the value of the initial contributions based on what 
probably was the value proposed by the parties, assumptions he makes later 
about the value of the services in particular are unwarranted and in fact 
determine his conclusions.  At the firm’s dissolution, Professor Barondes 
posits a loss of $18,680.  He does this by considering only the cash on hand 
at dissolution.  What happened to the value of the services?  Professor 
Barondes assumes that away—assumes it was worth only $0—when he 
insists that the partnership has only $1,320 in net assets.  Having assumed 
away the entire value of the services, Professor Barondes concludes that 
Reed necessarily ends up under accounting rules with a right to half of the 
remaining cash.  The inconsistency to which Professor Barondes points 
arises from his own assumption, not the court's opinion. 
 Given the initial valuation of the service partner's contribution, an 
accountant would never make such an assumption.  Equity is a residual 
category:  that which is left after liabilities are subtracted from assets.  We 
know how much cash the Kovacik-Reed partnership had on hand, but 
Professor Barondes first posited that Reed's services also had value.  The 
difficulty with Barondes's analysis is that he assumes a value for the 
services at dissolution.  In fact, their value at dissolution is uncertain, as we 
have noted.  They were only valued once, at the start, and then only 
relatively to a business opportunity of uncertain value.  Supposedly, the 
value of those services is now impaired somewhat, the business being in 
dissolution, but how much?  Professor Barondes assumes the value is 
impaired completely, but that is just an assumption.  What value is posited 
for those services at dissolution determines the accounting treatment 
entirely. 
 The Kovacik court appears to have given the benefit of the doubt to 
the only valuation that was ever put on the services:  that made by the 
money partner at the time of formation.  At that time, the money partner 
agreed that the services were equal to the money.  In between formation 
and dissolution, no market or other valuation occurred and no depreciation 
or impairment of the value is calculated, so an accountant at dissolution is 
more likely to keep the value of the services at that same, initial number.67  
For purposes of capital contributions, that is the value the Kovacik court 
used:  the same value as at formation, which is equal to the money.  What 
else should it do?  Given the uncertainty in the value itself and the money 
 
 66. Id. at 9-11 
 67. The value of the partner's future services may be diminished somewhat by shorter 
life expectancy but increased by greater firm-specific and business-plan-specific knowledge 
and ability. 
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partner's obvious prior concession, the court's decision is both 
economically and morally defensible.68 
 The court's analysis in partnership accounting therefore leads to 
quite a different accounting treatment at dissolution than the one Professor 
Barondes advocates: 
 
Kovacik:     $10,000 
        ($4,340) 
 
Total         $5,660 
 
Reed:         $10,000 
        ($4,340) 
 
Total         $5,660 
 
The partnership owes Kovacik and Reed $5,660 each.  Because the 
court has found, based on Kovacik’s agreement at formation, that the 
services have a value equal to Kovacik’s money, the value left in the 
partnership is actually $11,320.  This the parties split evenly, again based 
on their agreement at formation.  Kovacik will take the $5,660 in cash (the 
$1,320 left plus his $4,340 contribution to a capital loss), and Reed will 
keep the $5,660 of his services remaining in the partnership.  Kovacik takes 
nothing from Reed because they both owe equal amounts, and paying into 
the partnership would be a wash.  They are merely splitting the remaining 
capital.  The accounting treatment is thus not inconsistent with the court's 
opinion.  It is not true, then, that the parties must have agreed ex ante that 
Reed's services were worth the eventual amount of the cash loss.  The 
accounting treatment does not undermine the implied agreement that the 
money and services were equal in value.69 
 
 
 68. Oddly, Professor Barondes mentions this possibility in another part of the article.  
Asking what accounting treatment would be required if the partnership's losses exceeded the 
money capital, he proposes that the partners would split them and calls this proposal "not 
unreasonable."  Id. at 12-13.  But this conclusion is possible only if the value of Reed's 
services is set not at the amount of the ex post cash loss, as Professor Barondes argues that 
capital accounting requires, but at the exact amount of Kovacik's contribution, as the 
Kovacik court stated.  Barondes does not address this discrepancy. 
 69. In the final section of Professor Barondes's essay, he posits that Kovacik undertook 
not a one-time cash contribution of $10,000 but an ongoing contribution of $1,000 per 
month for ten months.  Noting how Kovacik's capital account would grow through the 
months until it equaled $10,000, Barondes supposes that Reed's account would grow at the 
same rate.  Id. at 14-16.  Thus, in this section, also, Barondes relies on exactly the same 
circular argument. 
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 c. Complexity.  
Professor Bainbridge raises one other objection.  He claims that the 
Kovacik rule is not worth its cost as an exception to an otherwise 
acceptable general rule.70  Bainbridge interprets Kovacik as a default rule 
and not as a reflection of the parties' agreement, but the litigation costs 
necessary to take advantage of the agreement-based exception may well 
encourage courts to require a more explicit agreement.  Just what costs 
does Professor Bainbridge attribute to the Kovacik rule?  The exception is 
complex, he notes, because its limits are uncertain:  "Only on the simple 
facts of Kovacik and its progeny . . . can such an exception be simply 
applied."71 
 The situations Bainbridge identifies as unclear, however, remain 
unlitigated since Kovacik was decided fifty-two years ago.  It is not hard to 
imagine why, and the reasons belie the complexity argument.  Bainbridge 
asks, What if partners are obliged to contribute additional capital?  What if 
a new partner joins or an old one leaves?72  But these situations force the 
partners to put a value on their shares, and thus on their contributions.  The 
result is that these situations create evidence that even more clearly shows 
the agreement of the parties with respect to the value the money partners 
place on the service contributions.  Becker v. Killarney73 is a fine example.  
Killarney and Feely bought into the partnership with $160,000 and 
$100,000 contributions, which gave them an 8% and a 5% interest, 
respectively.74  This fact showed that Killarney and Feely valued the 
partnership at $2 million and that they, at least implicitly, agreed that the 
other partners' contributions (all of which were service) were worth 87% of 
$2 million.  All partners were later required to contribute additional capital 
in their respective percentages,75 and this fact proved the same point.  The 
facts Professor Bainbridge claims bring complexity actually bring clarity. 
  What if the service partner "performs poorly or fails to perform at 
all"? Bainbridge also asks.76  With respect to this supposed ambiguity, 
Professor Bainbridge was interpreting Kovacik as a default rule only.  If the 
agreement-based rationale of Kovacik is considered, this is not an 
objection.  The service partner is guilty of breach, then, and having never 
contributed the required capital may not hold the money partner to the 
initial agreement.  Contribution may then be required in that instance. 
 Finally, Bainbridge calls Kovacik complex because it "draws a 
 
 70. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 665-66. 
 71. Id. at 666. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Becker v. Killarney, 532 N.E.2d 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 74. Id. at 932. 
 75. Id. at 933. 
 76. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 666. 
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wholly arbitrary line."77  Again, this conclusion reflects Bainbridge's 
insistence that the rule is merely a default rule.  But based as it is on the 
parties' agreement to split profits and omit any other payment to the service 
partner, with resulting implied ex ante equality of the partners' 
contributions, the rule is not arbitrary at all.  It rests on the need to hold the 
money partner to the original deal. 
 So the rule is not complex.  Tellingly, after suggesting the 
complexity argument, Professor Bainbridge felt an immediate need to 
account for the fifty-two-year lack of litigation over the Kovacik rule.78  As 
an explanation, he suggests that most dissolution suits result in a buy-out 
rather than litigation.79  I believe that is correct, but a consistent and simpler 
explanation for the lack of litigation is that the Kovacik rule works well.  
There is no need to explain the lack of litigation. 
 It should be apparent at this point that Kovacik is much more easily 
defended on grounds of agreement than as an imposition of public policy.  
On that point, both Professors Bainbridge and Barondes in fact agree.80  
And in fact, doctrinally Kovacik clearly is grounded in agreement.  That is 
apparent to anyone studying the two precedents on which the Kovacik court 
most expressly relied.  Those precedents come from Kentucky, and after 
Kovacik are the most cited cases in this area.  To those cases we now turn. 
C. Heran v. Hall (Ky. Ct. App. 1840)81 & Meadows v. Mocquot (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1901)82 
 Heran v. Hall is the source of the agreement-based rationale in 
Kovacik.83  The facts are simple.  Heran provided money and Hall provided 
the service of buying corn in Illinois and Missouri for shipment to New 
Orleans.  They agreed to divide profits equally.  There was no written 
agreement.  Heran sued Hall for one-half of Heran's capital loss.  The trial 
court denied Heran recovery, and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
affirmed.  The appellate court stated that "each will have sustained a 
correspondent loss of his capital," the one money and the other labor, and 
 
 77. Id. at 667. 
 78. Id. at 667-68. 
 79. Id. at 668 (citing, by analogy, John Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity 
and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation 
Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (1977)). 
 80. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 659 ("In sum, there does not appear to be a 
determinate majoritarian outcome to the hypothetical bargain in this context. . . . Similarly, 
none of the non-majoritarian default rules appear apt in this setting."); Barondes, supra note 
17, at 14. 
 81. Heran v. Hall, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 159 (Ky. 1840). 
 82. Meadows v. Mocquot, 61 S.W. 28 (Ky. 1901). 
 83. See Kovacik, 315 P.2d at 316. 
RICKSFINAL_ONE 1/22/2010  5:08:50 PM 
2009] SERVICE PARTNER CAPITAL AGREEMENTS  21 
 
therefore neither would be liable for contribution to the other.84 
 The agreement-related holding of the court is more obscure.  Here is 
the court's language: 
In this case, if, as we are disposed to consider the more probable, 
Hall was to furnish no other capital than his services, and operam 
pro pecunia valere, was, therefore, to receive a share of the 
profits, even had the purchase of the corn been, in fact joint, he 
would not be liable for the loss on Heran's capital.85 
"The work to be for [or to be worth] the money," quite literally from 
the Latin, means that Hall was working as a partner for the share of profits, 
not to make Heran wealthy, or even to preserve Heran's wealth.  By 
agreement, the partnership was created solely for the profit-making 
opportunity, not for the purpose of managing a pool of assets (contributed 
by Heran).  This is the equivalent of the rationale later adopted in Kovacik 
that an agreement to split profits and not pay the service partner any other 
compensation implies an agreement that the service partner not be liable for 
the capital losses of other partners. 
 Meadows followed Heran.  The facts are similar.  Meadows and 
Mocquot formed a partnership for the buying, ginning, and selling of 
cotton.86  Meadows paid for the cotton, kept accounts, and collected money 
from sales.  The money was placed in Meadows's bank account.  Mocquot 
handled the details—purchased the cotton, ginned it, and shipped it to 
market.  Their contract was verbal and the two parties expressly disagreed 
about whether under it Mocquot was to bear part of the loss.  Mocquot 
testified that he understood that he was not to bear any of the loss, 
"although nothing specially was said about loss."87 
 The court did not resolve the disputed testimony directly but 
nonetheless concluded that an agreement existed that Mocquot not be liable 
for half the loss.  The court explained the guiding principle in terms of 
"use" of the money, quoting Rutherford: 
"In partnership, where work is contributed on one side and 
money on the other, the partner from whom the money comes 
may contribute only the use of the money, or the property of it.  
If he contributes the use of it, and still keeps his property in the 
principal, so that the joint stock is to be considered as made up of 
the labor of one partner and of the use of the other's money, it is 
plain that, supposing the principal to be safe, it belongs to him, 
and that, supposing it to be lost, he alone bears the loss.  The 
other partner, . . . since . . . he had no claim to the principal 
 
 84. Heran, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) at 160. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Meadows, 61 S.W. at 28. 
 87. Id. 
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money, . . . cannot be obliged to make good any part of the loss . 
. . . But if he contributes the property of his money, so that the 
joint stock, upon which each of them has a common claim, is 
made up of his principal money and of the other's labor, then the 
partner who labors has a claim upon the principal money itself," 
[and therefore should share in its loss.]88 
The court claimed without much explanation that this principle was 
applied in Heran v. Hall.89 
 The point on which the court's analysis hangs is whether the partners 
became joint owners of the money contributed by the money partner, or 
only joint owners of the profits that could result from its investment.  This 
is a matter of agreement between the parties, and can be investigated 
independently of whether the parties themselves agreed explicitly on 
whether the service partner should be liable for a loss.  What facts show 
whether only the use of the money and not the property in it was 
contributed?  In Meadows, the court found that "it was one of the 
conditions of the partnership that, before any division of profits could be 
had, all the money contributed by [the money partner] was to be restored to 
him,—in other words, that the firm was to have only the use of the 
money."90  So therefore Mocquot was not liable for the money's loss.  In 
other words, the stipulation that money will be returned before profits are 
distributed shows an agreement that the service partner will not be liable 
for any loss of the money capital.  The inclusion of that kind of condition 
reaches the same result as an explicit agreement to declare the service 
partner's capital contribution equal to the money or other property 
contributed by the other partner. 
 In fact, the money partner's ability to dissolve, or disassociate from, 
the partnership at any time and demand a return of the money contribution 
is not very different than an explicit condition that the capital be repaid 
before profits are distributed.  If the venture has the cash, it will pay out to 
the money partner whatever the partnership can afford that the money 
partner expresses a desire to receive, up to the amount of the capital 
contribution.  A partnership is likely, as soon as it is able, to buy out a 
money partner who wants out, because the partnership under the implicit 
threat of dissolution or disassociation would rather be free of the threat.  
Meadows therefore adds relevant weight to the rule in Kovacik. 
 
 88. Id. at 29 (quoting T. RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW, BEING THE 
SUBSTANCE OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON GROTIUS DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS READ IN S.JOHNS 
COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE, Ch. XIII, §35 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1774)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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II. THE TEXAS CASES IN THE KOVACIK LINE 
Texas case law falls squarely in the Kovacik line, clearly supporting 
the finding in appropriate cases of implied agreement that the money 
partner will bear her own losses.  These cases are justified or justifiable on 
the same principles that support the leading cases from other jurisdictions. 
 There is a story of case law development here.  The cases involving 
money and service partners were decided against the background 
established for partnership capital cases in Johnston v. Ballard.91  
Description of that case and another following just after is a necessary 
preliminary. 
A. Preliminary I: Johnston v. Ballard (1892) 
Johnston is the precedential progenitor for Texas partnership capital 
cases.  It arose before statutes addressed the problem, so it was resolved 
largely through common law reasoning and judicial policy.  Ballard and 
Johnston formed and later dissolved a partnership.92  At dissolution, 
Johnston agreed to buy Ballard's interest.  Johnston paid Ballard $326.73, 
but then Ballard died, and his widow and children sued for more, 
complaining that Johnston had not paid the amount of Ballard's equity.93  
At issue, specifically, then, was how much capital Ballard owned.  The two 
partners had contributed wildly different amounts of cash; Johnston 
contributed ten times more than Ballard.94  In resolving this dispute, the 
court made several pronouncements later relevant in money and service 
partner cases. 
First, the court stated that it would initially assume that the parties 
held equal shares of the partnership capital: 
There seems to have been no articles of partnership, and there 
was no direct evidence of any character as to the terms of the 
partnership agreement.  Mr. Justice Story says:  "In the absence, 
 
 91. Johnston v. Ballard, 18 S.W. 686 (Tex. 1892). 
 92. Id. at 686. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Ballard contributed $298.80 and, over the life of the partnership, withdrew $763.82.  
Id. at 686.  Johnston contributed $2,404.86 and withdrew $240.  Id.  The partnership then 
dissolved, and Johnston agreed to purchase Ballard's interest for whatever the partnership 
books disclosed Ballard's interest to be worth.  Johnston paid Ballard $326.73.  Id.  Ballard 
then died.  Id.  Thinking Johnston had not yet paid enough, Ballard's widow Emma Ballard 
sued Johnston for the remainder of Ballard's interest.  Id.  In response, Johnston claimed he 
had overpaid and that Ballard's interest in the partnership was worth only $78.10.  Id.  
Johnson counterclaimed for the amount he overpaid.  Id.  The jury returned a verdict for 
Emma Ballard for $275.  Id.  At the time of the lawsuit, the partnership had net assets of 
$2,428.35.  Id. 
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however, of all precise stipulations between the partners in 
respect to their respective shares in the profits and losses, and in 
the absence of all other controlling evidence and circumstances, 
the rule of the common law is that they are to share equally of 
both, for in such case equality would seem to be equity."  Story, 
Partn. § 24.  The rule, we think, should be extended further, and 
that, when there is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, as 
to their respective shares in the capital stock, the presumption is 
also that they hold an equal interest.95 
Justice Story spoke of profits and losses.  The court cited three cases 
from other jurisdictions all supporting the Johnston court's extension of the 
rule to partnership capital.96 
 This principle is fair on its face.  It might also be fair as applied.  
Sometimes partners will have put in the same amount of cash or property as 
contributions to capital.  When they have done this, a presumption that they 
hold an equal interest makes perfect sense.  That the court would start with 
the same presumption in a case in which one partner contributed ten times 
what the other did is striking!  The move indicates the strength of the 
presumption.  Surely it would also cover a case in which neither partner 
contributed money but both contributed only service.  The court next stated 
the presumption as a general rule for all partnerships: 
Where there is no evidence except the mere fact that a 
partnership exists, a rule that the partners hold unequal shares in 
any distinct proportion would necessarily be arbitrary.  But we 
know that each has some interest, and justice would seem to 
demand that their interests should be presumed to be equal.  How 
inequality of interest, in the absence of proof of some controlling 
circumstance, could be arrived at and especially the proportion of 
the respective interests, we are at a loss to conceive.97 
Surely the presumption is also strong enough to cover the money-
service partner problem.  If the presumption applies in a case in which one 
partner submitted ten times more cash than the other, surely the same 
presumption would apply in a case in which one partner submitted cash or 
property and the other submitted services of uncertain value.  The rule 
 
 95. Johnston, 18 S.W. at 686 (quoting Story, Partn. §24) (internal citations omitted). 
 96. Id. (citing Northrup v. McGill, 27 Mich. 234, 235 (1873) ("Supposing that they 
were partners, the law would, doubtless, in the absence of explanations or of facts leading to 
another inference, fully authorize the presumption that they were equal partners."); Farr v. 
Johnson, 25 Ill. 522, 525 (1861) ("As we understand the rule, when a partnership has been 
shown to exist, unless rebutted, it is the presumption that the partnership is equal."); Roach 
v. Perry, 16 Ill. 37, 38 (1854) ("Where the proof shows a partnership, but does not show the 
respective interests of the several members of the firm, the law will presume that they were 
equal partners.")). 
 97. Johnston, 18 S.W. at 686-87. 
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seems to mandate that the service partner’s contribution be held equal in 
value to the money partner’s contribution. 
 Actually, the court had something to say about the service partner 
problem.  It mentioned the problem in a confusing bit of dicta: 
We conclude that, although unequal contribution to the capital on 
part of the respective partners may not, in the absence of other 
evidence, be sufficient to overcome the presumption of an equal 
participation in the profits, it is sufficient to show that the capital 
is not to be divided upon a final settlement and distribution.  It is 
not unreasonable to presume that the use of the money of the 
partner furnishing the greater proportion of the capital is 
compensated by the services of the other, and that, therefore, they 
should share equally in the profits.  But upon dissolution of such 
a partnership the latter necessarily retains his services, and it 
would seem just that the other should be entitled to withdraw his 
capital.98 
What are we to make of this?  The court says that the equality 
presumption is applicable to profits, losses, and capital, but not strong 
enough to apply at dissolution.  Then the court says the presumption 
applies to money-service partnerships such that they split profits equally.  
However, when it addressed what will happen “[b]ut upon dissolution,” it 
recommends for a money-service partnership a result focused not on a 
difference in capital contribution value but on equality:  the service partner 
“necessarily retains his services, and it would seem just that the other 
should be entitled to withdraw his capital.”  The apparent equality of the 
two contributions—“it would seem just” because it seems equal—is the 
focus of the court's reasoning and the basis of its recommendation. 
All of this was dicta, anyway.  As it turned out, some evidence of 
agreement resolved the question in the case, sort of.  The court found 
evidence that the two partners "did not intend that the partner who paid in 
the larger proportion of the capital should not be compensated therefor [sic] 
in settlement upon dissolution."99  The court reported that, sometime after 
each partner had contributed $241.65, a conversation between the partners 
occurred in which Johnston told Ballard that Ballard had to contribute 
equally, and Ballard agreed to do so.100  But, in fact, Ballard had not 
contributed any more, and the court thought Ballard's declining to 
contribute (after an agreement to do so?) disrupted the presumption of 
equality.  The court held that Ballard was fully compensated for his 
partnership interest by Johnston's payment of $326.73, about $900 short of 
 
 98. Id. at 687. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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half of the partnership's capital.101  The court did not say how it moved 
from the premise of Ballard’s lack of further contribution to the conclusion 
that the partners intended unequal interests.  What the parties "intended" 
was implied by their conduct. 
Perhaps the court later felt some of the case's ambiguity and tried to 
resolve it.  Over half a century later, in another partnership dissolution case, 
the court reported Johnston in such a way that the general presumption of 
equal capital is reversed, but the dicta retains the confusing attempt to 
refute equality while specifying an equal remedy—“it would seem just” 
because it is equal—in the dissolution of a money-service partnership: 
[T]he opinion in that case observed that where a partnership 
agreement is silent as to the distribution of the capital upon 
dissolution, the partners are entitled to share in the capital, not 
equally, but in proportion to the respective amounts contributed 
by them; that where one partner furnishes money and another 
services, upon dissolution the latter necessarily retains his 
services and it would seem but just that the other should be 
entitled to withdraw his capital.102 
Note, however, that though the general presumption is reversed, the 
effect of the presumption of equality is preserved for partnerships of money 
and services, just as the Johnston court stated it.  In fact, the force of that 
presumption is preserved explicitly in the holding of the next case, which 
addressed a service partner's capital rights. 
B. Preliminary II: Washington v. Washington (1895)103 
 Not long after Johnston, the Court of Civil Appeals followed in 
another case involving dissolution of a partnership without a capital loss.  
J.R. Washington ranched with his father.  When J.R. died, J.R.'s widow 
Mollie sued her father-in-law, alleging that J.R. and his father were 
partners and that she was now entitled to certain personal property from the 
partnership.  Evidence as to who contributed what and who owned it at the 
time it was contributed was scattered and conflicting.104  The court 
instructed the jury, if they found a partnership, to find for Mollie for “one-
half of the value of all property owned by the firm at the time of the 
dissolution.”105  The jury found for Mollie, but the appellate court reversed.  
It held that an instruction from Johnston v. Ballard would have been more 
proper: 
 
 101. Id. at 686, 688. 
 102. Newman v. Newman, 198 S.W. 2d 91, 93 (Tex. 1946). 
 103. Washington v. Washington, 31 S.W. 88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). 
 104. Id. at 88-89. 
 105. Id. at 89. 
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If the evidence shows an agreement to enter into a partnership, 
and nothing more, the law will presume equality of interests in all 
firm property on hand at the time of the dissolution.  If the 
evidence shows an agreement to enter into a partnership, and that 
one of the partners contributed the capital and the other the labor 
and skill, and fails to show the basis upon which the division is to 
be made upon dissolution, the jury would at least be authorized to 
find that the amount so contributed was to be first returned, and 
only the remainder divided.106 
The property and the service are equal, in other words.  As a result, the 
service partner receives back his services for the future and the contributor 
of the property receives back the property.107 
C. The First Case: Johnston v. Steele (1908)108 
 Johnston v. Steele is the first case I have found that squarely 
addresses a claim by a money (here property) partner against a service 
partner for contribution to a loss.  Johnston leased certain pasture land.109  
Johnston and Steele entered into a partnership agreement under which 
Steele would have charge of the land.  Johnston's sheep would graze there, 
but Johnston would continue to own the sheep.  According to the 
agreement, when the sheep sold, expenses for pasturing would be deducted, 
Johnston would be paid his cost for the sheep, and then the two would split 
the profits.  Johnston would always own both sheep and land.110 
 No profits resulted from this arrangement, only losses.  Johnston 
sued Steele for one-half of those losses.  The court rejected this suit, 
however, on the ground that the partnership agreement could not be 
construed to require Steele to pay.  The court explained:  "As we 
understand it, Johnston was to furnish the sheep, and out of the proceeds of 
the sale thereof expenses were to be paid.  Steele, on the other hand, was to 
give his time and attention to the business and share in the profits."111  
These facts, the court said, required a verdict for Steele.  The opinion is 
brief, and without any more or clearer rationale.  A later court of appeals 
opinion reasoned, 
From the opinion . . . it is clear that Johnston furnished to the 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. A similar argument was accepted in Kessler v. Antinora, 653 A.2d 579, 582 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) ("Thus, upon the loss of both some money and labor, the loss 
falls upon each proportionately without any legal recourse . . . .  Each party shoulders a loss, 
one in determinative dollars; the other in labor, difficult, if not impossible, to quantify."). 
 108. Johnson v. Steele, 107 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). 
 109. Id. at 632. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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partnership only the use of his land and sheep, against the labor 
and personal services of Steele, and that the potential profits were 
all that was owned by the partnership.  In that kind of case the 
law is well established that the partner furnishing only the use of 
his money or property must stand the loss of such of that money 
or property as may be incurred in the operation of the business.112 
D. The Leading Second Case: Bivins v. Proctor113 
 In Bivins, an opinion by the Texas Commission of Appeals later 
adopted by the Texas Supreme Court, the court finally addressed the 
service partner problem in terms that remain familiar today. 
 Bivins, Goodman, and Proctor were partners from October 1, 1928, 
to January 15, 1929, when Bivins died.114  Bivins furnished cattle and part 
of the money for the purchase of other cattle.  Goodman and Proctor gave 
their time and service to the pasturing, handling, and sale of the cattle.  
There was a division of net profits planned after the sale.  The firm name 
was "Bivins, Proctor & Goodman."115 
 But on Bivins’ death, the partnership had to buy out Bivins' interest.  
The partnership was not wealthy:  It was unable to pay back all Bivins had 
put in, without the other partners contributing.  The question was whether 
the other partners had to contribute to a capital loss. 
 The court first reasoned, in language harking back to Johnston v. 
Ballard,116 that partners, absent any other agreement, are "presumed . . . 
equal as to both profits and losses."117  This general rule, the court said, 
includes capital losses.118  The court explained:  “‘The partnership, as an 
entity distinct from its individual members, becomes indebted to them for 
the capital they advance, and upon a settlement this debt should be paid just 
as any other liability of the firm, except that it is subordinate to the prior 
claims of creditors.’”119 
 But the rule is not so hard and fast as it seems: 
A partnership in its very nature involves the essentials of a 
"community of interests, the common enterprise, its operation for 
the joint account, and a right in the owner of each interest to 
share as a principal in its profits as such."  Proof, therefore, of the 
 
 112. Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). 
 113. Bivins v. Proctor, 80 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935) (opinion adopted by 
the Texas Supreme Court). 
 114. Id. at 308. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra Part II.A. 
 117. Bivins, 80 S.W.2d at 308-09. 
 118. Id. at 309. 
 119. Id. at 315 (quoting Buie v. Kennedy, 80 S.E. 445, 446 (N.C. 1913)). 
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partnership being made—nothing else appearing—there would 
be prima facie a community of interests in the capital, with an 
implication of law that each owner would participate in losses; 
but such is seldom the case, and the underlying general rule is 
that "whether a loss of capital is a partnership loss, to be borne by 
all the parties, depends upon the nature and extent of the contract 
of partnership."120 
Regarding cases departing from the general rule that a service partner 
participate in money or property losses, the court reasoned as follows: 
[Y]et a careful consideration of such cases will show that they . . 
. are cases where the proof established a particular fact situation 
by which it was shown that there was in reality a specific 
agreement which fixed the rights and liabilities of the parties. . . . 
In our opinion, . . . “it requires a special agreement to prevent the 
conclusion of a community of interests in the property as well as 
in the profit and loss.”121 
Clearly direct proof of a special agreement would suffice to show that 
one exists,122 but the court describes when it will find an implied 
agreement:  It will look to "the nature and extent of the contract of 
partnership," “a particular fact situation [that would show] that there was in 
reality a specific agreement”123 to depart from the general rule.  The 
particular fact situation is proved, and the specific agreement is inferred 
from it. 
 The court does not elaborate further in general terms but later in the 
opinion the court describes one such particular fact situation: 
There is [a] line of cases . . . where the use of money or property 
was contributed by one partner over against the labor and 
services of another, the one contributing the money or property 
retaining title thereto, and expecting to realize interest thereon or 
from the use thereof from the profits of the venture, in which 
event the one contributing the labor and services was not liable 
for contribution to losses sustained by the other.  In each of the 
cases mentioned there was a special written agreement to that 
effect or a finding that such was the nature of the contract. 
There is a line of cases where property or money itself, as 
distinguished from its mere use, was contributed on the one part 
and labor and services on the other, and in those cases it has been 
 
 120. Id. at 311 (citing Freeman v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 153 S.W. 122, 125 (Tex. 
1916) (first quotation); citation omitted from second quotation). 
 121. Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at 309, 311. An example of an agreement directly proved can be found in 
Sturdevant v. Hooper, 101 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 
 123. 80 S.W.2d at 309, 311. 
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held that losses of capital must be borne by all partners.124 
Readers of this paper will recognize the reasoning.  The Bivins court 
cited for it Hall v. Heran125 and Meadows v. Mocquot.126 
 In Bivins itself, the court reviewed the evidence—correspondence, 
bank records, and so on—and found that the partners, including Bivins, 
clearly intended the partnership to own Bivins’ contributions rather than 
merely to have the use of them.  A great deal of circumstantial evidence 
existed showing that title to cattle Bivins contributed and financed was 
transferred to the firm name.127  This was enough to show that the 
exception did not apply. 
 After concluding that the exception did not apply, the opinion casts 
doubt on its breadth.  The court suspected in dicta that it may not apply 
"except in cases of the use of real estate or buildings by a partnership," 
which may be restored after use by the partnership to the original owner.128  
But the court in fact entertained the argument when a partner contributed 
cattle.  And a long quotation from an opinion quoted with approval in 
Bivins indicates that money may also be contributed in this fashion.129  
Clearly there was life left for the exception in later cases, which is why it 
was discussed again at length a few years later in the next case. 
E. The Third: Paggi v. Quinn (1944)130 
Paggi, Quinn, and Turner entered into a written contract of partnership 
in January 1917 for the purpose of buying and farming "the Norton 
farm."131  This was a rice farm.  The partnership took over Norton's lease on 
the farm in exchange for $12,000, including the teams, tools, and 
machinery.  Paggi took a half interest in the partnership, Quinn 4/10ths, and 
 
 124. Id. at 311. 
 125. Heran v. Hall, 40 Ky. 159 (Ky. Ct. App. 1840), discussed supra Part I.C. 
 126. Meadows v. Mocquot, 61 S.W. 28, 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901), discussed supra Part 
I.C. 
 127. Bivins, 80 S.W.2d at 308-09. 
 128. Id. at 315. 
 129. The opinion is Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), cited 
in Bivins, 80 S.W.2d at 310.  The language in Masterson states: 
In partnership, where work is contributed on one side and money on the other, 
the partner from whom the money comes may contribute only the use of the 
money or the property of it.  If he contributes the use of it, and still keeps his 
property in the principal, so that the joint stock is to be considered as made up 
of the labor of one partner and the use of the other’s money, it is plain that, 
supposing the principal to be safe, it belongs to him, and that, supposing it to be 
lost, he alone bears the loss. 
Id. at 542 (quoting T. Rutherford, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW at 140 (2 Am. Ed. 1802)). 
 130. Paggi v. Quinn, 179 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). 
 131. Id. at 791. 
RICKSFINAL_ONE 1/22/2010  5:08:50 PM 
2009] SERVICE PARTNER CAPITAL AGREEMENTS  31 
 
Turner 1/10th.  The agreement provided that Paggi would furnish all the 
money, or secure a loan for the partnership, initially to buy the Norton 
property.  The other partners agreed to pay 8% interest annually as it 
accrued on the amount of money required to pay for their respective 
interests.  The agreement also provided that Paggi might supply money to 
buy livestock, too, on the same basis.  Turner was to be in active charge 
and control of the farm and receive $75 per month as salary.  The expenses 
of the operation were to be paid first from gross revenues.  The residue was 
to be divided among the partners in proportion to their shares.  The 
arrangement was to last for five years and was known as B.E. Quinn & 
Company.  Quinn later purchased the interests of Turner.132 
 Paggi died on January 30, 1921.  His estate sued Quinn in 1926 over 
continuing partnership expenses and also for half of what Paggi contributed 
to the partnership in the first place, which it claimed formed the capital of 
the partnership.133  Eventually, the estate and Quinn decided to wind up the 
partnership, but Quinn refused to pay either the half of the expenses the 
estate had advanced or a share of the money Paggi had originally paid to 
begin the partnership.  The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the 
court of appeals reversed.134 
 The court had no trouble ordering Quinn to repay his share of the 
expenses the Paggi estate had advanced to the business.  The court noted 
that a partnership operates for the joint account of the partners, with the 
right of each to share in profits and "the responsibility of each for the 
losses."135  Moreover, partners are liable for the debts of the partnership, the 
court noted, and "advances of money to the firm by a partner to discharge 
partnership obligations are nothing more than loans to the partnership, and 
the party advancing them becomes a creditor of the partnership."136  Hence, 
Quinn owed Paggi half of the advancements. 
 With regard to the money Paggi originally used to finance the 
partnership, which the Paggi estate claimed to be a capital investment, the 
court began by noting the traditional rule:  "Where it is sought to relieve 
any of the members from loss of capital in the partnership, a special 
contractual stipulation to that effect is essential.  Bivins v. Proctor . . . ."137  
The court later confirmed, "[P]artners may stipulate for a variance of the 
rule as between themselves and it is always necessary to look to the 
contract entered into between them to ascertain the exact liability the 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 792. 
 134. Id. at 792, 795. 
 135. Id. at 793. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (citing Bivins v. Proctor, 80 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Comm’n Appl. 1935)). 
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parties . . . have assumed."138  Citing the rule from Bivins that a partner is 
liable for her own capital loss if she has merely contributed use of the 
money or property, rather than its title, Quinn argued that the money Paggi 
originally used to fund the partnership was only given to the partnership to 
use, not to own, and that Quinn was therefore not liable for any share of its 
loss.139  Quinn's argument seems reasonable enough given that Paggi 
charged an interest rate for the money.140 
 In the end, the court preserved the exception but refused to grant 
Quinn judgment: 
In most of the cases involving the use of capital furnished by one 
of the partners, the capital so furnished was property, such as 
buildings, livestock, and the like.  It is, no doubt, true that the use 
of money could be so furnished as the capital of the firm, such, 
for instance, as a partnership formed for the purpose of loaning 
money or where property is purchased with the money of one of 
the partners and the ownership placed in him and retained by him 
as his property; but the contract here involved plainly provides 
that the capital of the partnership should be the lease and that it 
was being acquired, not by Paggi, but by the partnership.141 
So Paggi had not even given the partnership the use of the money.142  
The initial capital of the partnership was in fact only the Norton farm.  
Since the money was not capital, Quinn "was not liable . . . for his 
proportion of the money advanced by . . . Paggi upon the theory . . . that 
each partner is liable for his proportion of lost capital."143  But then what 
was the status of the money Paggi advanced?  The court gave a number of 
other options, including that the money might or might not be a partnership 
debt and that the partners may have intended to pay it back only through 
profits.144  The court apparently thought it impossible that the partners did 
not provide for its repayment at all, however, and remanded for further 
factual development.  Quinn thus might still have been liable for the 
money's loss, as his share of the repayment of an advancement. 
 The court made one other pronouncement on the theory.  On a 
motion for rehearing, the court also found that Quinn had been paid for his 
services.  This, the court explained, "is another feature which we think 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 794. 
 140. In discussing the "use only" situation, the court considered two cases it thought 
were examples.  One is a Texas case, Johnston v. Steele, 107 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1908), discussed supra Part II.C.  The other is Heran v. Hall, 40 Ky. 159 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1840), discussed supra Part I.C. 
 141. Paggi, 179 S.W.2d at 794. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 794. 
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shows it was not contemplated by the parties that Paggi would merely 
furnish the use of his money against the labor and personal services of 
[Quinn]."145  Paggi thus preserves the Bivins precedent while not expanding 
it.  
F. The Texas Cases Live On 
 Johnston v. Steele and Bivins are clearly cousins of Kovacik.146  The 
other cases cited here are their children or other lineal relatives.  This 
family of Texas cases has not been touched, judicially.147  Nor has it been 
superseded by Texas statutes, which have always preserved the potential 
modification of default capital allocation rules by agreement.148 
III. CONCLUSION & EPILOGUE 
 I am not sure what other than antipathy to litigation itself or perhaps 
to litigation over business relationships causes commentators and even the 
Uniform Partnership Code such concern with Kovacik and its relatives.  
Perhaps the commentators and code favor money over brains, or disregard 
any value that cannot be easily monetized (certainly economists and 
accountants favor numbers that are certain).  The arguments against the 
cases rely on faulty logic, unrealistic expectations of both service and 
money partners, or spurious arguments from code provisions that actually 
 
 145. Id. at 796. 
 146. Bivins was recognized as falling in the Heran v. Hall line of authority in Newton v. 
Sackett, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 507 (Ct. Comm'n Pl. 1957). 
 147. In fact, Bivins was cited as authoritative by the Texas Supreme Court in Park Cities 
Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 568, 673 n.6 (Tex. 1976), and Newman v. Newman, 198 S.W.2d 
91 (Tex. 1947). 
 148. See Texas Business Organization Code, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.002(a) 
(2006); Revised Partnership Act, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. art. 6132b-1.03(a) (1993) 
(current version at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-1.03 (2008)); Texas Uniform 
Partnership Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 18 (1987) (expired).  Sher and 
Bromberg criticized the cases in a wooden, deductive manner in 1957.  Byron D. Sher & 
Alan R. Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20th Century—Why Texas Should Adopt 
the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 SW. L.J. 263, 288-94 (1958).  Sher & Bromberg argued that 
the cases are not based in agreement but on notions of "use" and "labor" which could not 
arise under the Uniform Partnership Act.  Id. at 294.  But the language from the cases 
themselves proves that the reasoning is grounded in agreement.  The Uniform Partnership 
Act stated in 1914 that the rights of each partner to be "repaid his contributions" was 
"subject to any agreement between” the partners, Uniform Partnership Act § 18(a) (1914), 
an exception that continues in the partnership codes today, Uniform Partnership Act § 
103(a) (1997); Texas Business Organizations Code § 152.002(a) (2006).  Moreover, 
Kovacik, decided under the Uniform Partnership Act, proves that such cases could arise 
under the Act.  See also Steven G. Frost, Illinois' Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 90 ILL. 
B.J. 644, 648 n.7 (2002) ("Presumably, the account provisions added in the Act will not 
change the results of this decision [Becker v. Killarney]."). 
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allow the Kovacik line life and health.  The Kovacik-Bivins cases align 
most closely with the deal the partners likely struck at formation.  
Accordingly, the finding of an implied agreement in them is justified. 
 Of course, the agreement exception cannot be applied in ham-
handed fashion.  Of course there will be times when an agreement cannot 
be implied in a money and service partnership.  Perhaps the parties are 
sophisticated enough that they are actually aware of the default rule.  
Perhaps they are sophisticated enough to bargain around it.  Sometimes 
other facts may preclude a finding of an implied agreement.  But 
categorically outlawing them denies what the parties most likely agreed.  
To the extent a categorical rule denies the parties' actual bargain, it is both 
inefficient and unfair. 
 Kovacik and Bivins should be preserved. 
